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LEONARD LEE, MICHELLE P. LEE, MARCO BERTINI, GAL ZAUBERMAN, 
and DAN ARIELY*
Consumers often make product choices that involve the consideration 
of money and time. Building on dual-process models, the authors 
propose that these two basic resources activate qualitatively different 
modes of processing: while money is processed analytically, time is 
processed more affectively. Importantly, this distinction then influences 
the stability of consumer preferences. An initial set of three experiments 
demonstrates that, compared with a control condition free of the 
consideration of either resource, money consideration generates 
significantly more violations of transitivity in product choice, while time 
consideration has no such impact. The next three experiments use 
multiple approaches to demonstrate the role of different processing 
modes associated with money versus time consideration in this result. 
Finally, two additional experiments test ways in which the cognitive noise 
associated with the analytical processing that money consideration 
triggers could be reduced, resulting in more consistent preferences.
Keywords: money, time, consumer choice, preference consistency, dual 
process models
Money, Time, and the Stability of Consumer 
Preferences
Consumers often make product decisions that involve the 
consideration of money and time. There is little contention 
that these two basic resources have different effects on a 
variety of judgments and behaviors. For example, people 
are more susceptible to the sunk-cost fallacy when they con 
sider past investments in money than in time (Soman 2001). 
Compared with the present, they perceive themselves to 
have less slack (i.e., less availability) in money than in time 
in the future and, therefore, tend to discount money less 
than time (Zauberman and Lynch 2005). In addition, people 
are willing to take fewer risks when making investments in
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money than when making investments in time (Okada and 
Hoch 2004), but they are more risk seeking when making 
risky decisions involving losses of money than losses of 
time (Leclerc, Schmitt, and Dube 1995). Notably, focusing 
on money instead of time could even make people less ethi 
cal, more hardworking, and less socially active (Gino and 
Mogilner 2014; Mogilner 2010).
In this research, we investigate the distinction between 
money and time from a different perspective. Specifically, we 
examine the possibility that money and time also differ fun 
damentally in the type of processing mode they evoke and, 
thus, their resultant effects on preference stability. Building 
on prior work on dual-process models (Epstein 1994), we 
propose that the consideration of money brings about a pro 
cessing mode that is more analytical whereas the considera 
tion of time brings about a processing mode that is more 
affective. Consequently, focusing on these basic resources 
has important implications for product choice, specifically 
with respect to the stability of consumer preferences.
MONEY AND TIME ELICIT DIFFERENT PROCESSING 
MODES
The notion that decision making comprises two distinct 
modes of processing with different characteristics is well 
accepted in many branches of psychology (Chaiken and
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Trope 1999; Dhar and Gorlin 2013; Evans 2008). In this 
research, we focus on two specific modes of processing- 
analytical and affective—and build on a substantial body of 
work by Epstein and colleagues on the cognitive-experiential 
self-theory (CEST; Epstein 1994; Epstein et al. 1992; 
Epstein and Pacini 1999; Kirkpatrick and Epstein 1992). This 
stream of research expounds two information-processing 
modes: an analytical or rational mode that operates accord 
ing to the rules of logic and an affective or experiential 
mode that elicits more feeling-based responses. While the 
analytical mode of processing relies on logical reasoning 
characterized as piecemeal and dispassionate, the affective 
mode of processing is intimately associated with feelings 
characterized as holistic and emotional (Epstein et al. 1992, 
p. 336).
A wide array of other models distinguish two modes of 
processing, albeit with different perspectives and emphases 
across models. These models have variously used terms 
such as “hot” versus “cold,” “automatic” versus “con 
trolled,” “implicit” versus “explicit,” “System 1” versus 
“System 2,” “hedonic” versus “informational,” “reflexive” 
versus “reflective,” and “associative” versus “rule-based” to 
distinguish their focal processing modes, and some amount 
of overlap naturally exists among these models (Bargh 
1997; Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2011; Kahneman and 
Frederick 2002; Lieberman et al. 2002; Metcalfe and Mis- 
chel 1999; Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999; Sloman 1996; Zajonc 
1980; Zauberman, Diehl, and Ariely 2006). Our purpose in 
this work is not to test the merits of these numerous models, 
nor to show the concomitant presence of all associated char 
acteristics when a particular processing mode is in operation. 
Instead, drawing on Epstein’s (1994) dichotomy, we pro 
pose and demonstrate that the analytical mode of processing 
is evoked (i.e., focusing on costs and benefits and using 
more piecemeal assessments) when money considerations 
are involved in a decision and the affective mode is evoked 
(i.e., focusing on pleasure and enjoyment and more holistic 
assessments) when time considerations are involved.1
Several findings in the growing literature on money-time 
distinctions provide support for our main proposition. For 
example, merely posing a question about money or time 
activates different motivations that can influence the inten 
tion to donate money to a charity (Liu and Aaker 2008). 
Money is arguably the most common medium for economic 
exchange, and thinking about money tends to prompt a 
value-maximizing goal and considerations of economic 
value. In contrast, the consideration of time leads people to 
focus on emotional meaning and well-being and, along with 
that, a greater willingness to engage in prosocial behavior. 
Moreover, prompting people to consider money spent rather 
than time spent on a product is less likely to trigger a focus 
on the experience of using the product and a sense of per 
sonal connection to it (Mogilner and Aaker 2009). In the 
same vein, priming individuals to think about money versus 
time leads to less focus on happiness and, consequently,
■We adopt the terms “analytical” and “affective” to describe our two 
focal processing modes instead of Epstein’s (1994) original labels (“ratio 
nal” and “experiential”) for greater descriptive precision and to avoid 
potential confusion, given that these terms have loaded meanings across 
disciplines (e.g., in the behavioral economics literature, “rational” 
describes the normality of decision outcomes according to classical eco 
nomic theory in addition to a particular decision process.)
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lower willingness to pursue activities that result in greater 
subjective well-being (Mogilner 2010). More recently, 
priming individuals to think about money has also been 
shown to activate a more piecemeal, attribute-based evalua 
tion strategy, while priming individuals to think about time 
activates a more holistic, alternative-based evaluation strat 
egy (Su and Gao 2014). While these studies focus on differ 
ent constructs and behavioral consequences, they all share a 
common basis: they allude to a mode of processing that is 
more analytical and less affective in nature when money 
rather than time is considered and in which logic rather than 
affect takes center stage.2
DUAL PROCESSING AND PREFERENCE 
CONSISTENCY
The primary goal of our experiments is to test our 
hypothesis that money consideration and time consideration 
evoke different modes of processing in a product-choice 
context. Prior findings from the money-time literature 
investigate how leading people to think about money or 
time (through implicit priming or explicit instructions) has 
downstream effects on behaviors such as charitable giving, 
product attitudes, and social engagement. In contrast to these 
studies, our interest lies in examining a common product- 
choice context in which product options have either a 
money or a time component, among other attributes. How 
ever, rather than studying what specific choices consumers 
make as a function of money or time, we are interested in 
how these two resources differentially influence the consis 
tency of product preferences.
Several reasons motivate the choice of preference consis 
tency as the primary dependent measure. Prior research sug 
gests that analytical and affective processing can result in 
different degrees of preference consistency. In particular, 
Lee, Amir, and Ariely (2009) find that when a stimulus 
evokes greater affect, such as when it is presented pictori- 
ally or in color, preference consistency improves. Inducing 
greater trust in one’s feelings when making a decision simi 
larly leads to greater preference consistency. In a related set 
of studies, Pham et al. (2001) show that participants demon 
strate greater consistency in a variety of assessments when 
they make feeling-based rather than reason-based judg 
ments. These findings stem from the premise that affective 
processing tends to be more holistic (Epstein and Pacini 
1999) and that focusing on the gist of a target stimulus 
ensures that a more consistent manner of assessment is 
brought to bear. This stands in contrast to analytical pro 
cessing, which tends to be piecemeal and entails a more 
inconsistent weighting of information (Nordgren and Dijk- 
sterhuis 2009), generating “cognitive noise” that can 
adversely affect preference stability (Lee, Amir, and Ariely 
2009).
In light of these findings, if money consideration indeed 
evokes analytical processing and time consideration evokes 
affective processing, one would expect less consistent pref-
2In a pilot study, we found preliminary support for the notion that money 
is associated with more analytical processing and that time is associated 
with greater affective processing. Specifically, participants who were 
primed to think about money (1) were more likely to consider costs and 
benefits over pleasure and enjoyment and (2) were more likely to rely on 
piecemeal assessments rather than holistic processing in an ostensibly 
unrelated product-evaluation task.
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erences in the case of money. Thus, the dependent measure 
of preference consistency can serve as a means to test the 
hypothesized difference in processing modes.
More generally, the notion of stable consumer prefer 
ences has broad relevance and theoretical significance in 
economics and psychology (Bern 1972; Festinger 1957; 
Lee, Amir, and Ariely 2009; Mas-Colell, Whinston, and 
Green 1995; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1988). From a 
psychometric perspective, consistency represents the upper 
bound for validity in any measurement, therefore setting a 
limit on decision quality (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). 
From a more practical perspective, various marketing appli 
cations (e.g., new product development, market research, 
customer relationship management) implicitly assume that 
preferences are consistent over time in inferring consumers’ 
future behavior from past or intended behavior. Together, 
these various perspectives highlight the theoretical and 
practical importance of understanding the antecedents of 
preference consistency.
We structure the remainder of the article as follows. The 
next two sections provide an overview of our experiments 
and describe the experimental paradigm we adopt in most of 
our experiments. We then report in detail the design and 
results of each experiment. We conclude with a general dis 
cussion in which we highlight the differences between our 
findings and related work in the literature, discuss practical 
implications, and suggest future research questions.
OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENTS
To examine the different processing modes that money 
consideration and time consideration activate and their 
ensuing impact on preference consistency, we conducted 
eight experiments. The first block of experiments (1-3) tests 
the basic hypothesis that money consideration in product 
choice leads to more inconsistent preferences than time con 
sideration. Across these experiments, we establish the 
robustness of the effect using different stimuli and experi 
mental procedures while attempting to rule out competing 
explanations. The second block of experiments (4—6) exam 
ines the underlying mechanism that accounts for this differ 
ence in preference consistency—namely, that the considera 
tion of money results in greater analytical processing and 
the consideration of time in greater affective processing. 
The final block of experiments (7-8) investigates a possible 
reason for why monetary information, when processed ana 
lytically, causes preferences to be inconsistent (relative to 
time). We suggest that because price plays different roles 
across contexts (e.g., price as a signal of quality vs. price as an 
expense) and because the mapping between price and utility 
is consequently imprecise, the greater analytical processing 
that money consideration triggers generates greater cogni 
tive noise and leads to greater preference inconsistency.
EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Across all eight experiments, we used the same two-stage 
binary choice paradigm adapted from Lee, Amir, and Ariely 
(2009): In the learning stage, participants were shown a set 
of product options with each option described by several 
product attributes, including a money-related and/or a time- 
related attribute. They were given as much time as they 
wanted to examine the products. Subsequently, in the deci 
sion stage, participants saw all pairwise combinations of
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these options presented sequentially and in a random order. 
For each pair, they had to choose the option they preferred. 
Participants were told at the beginning of the experiment 
before studying any of the options that they would have to 
make these choices in the second stage.
We measured preference (in)consistency through viola 
tions of transitivity. Transitivity indicates the extent to 
which a decision maker exhibits a set of well-defined, 
coherent preferences (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 
1995). Specifically, for any three products a, b, and c, transi 
tivity implies that if a -* b and b -* c, then a -* c, where -* 
denotes preference. Conversely, transitivity is violated if 
a -» b and b —» c, yet c -* a. By counting the total number 
of violations per participant (Kendall and Babington Smith 
1940), we obtain an individual-level measure of (inconsis 
tency that we can compare across experimental conditions. 
That is, the greater the number of transitivity violations a 
decision maker commits, the more intransitive his or her 
preferences are.
TESTING THE BASIC EFFECT
Experiment 1: Choosing International Flights—An Initial 
Test
Objective and method. We designed Experiment 1 to test 
whether people exhibit greater preference consistency when 
making product choices that involve the consideration of 
money or time. In this experiment, 166 students from a uni 
versity in the United States were asked to imagine that they 
were purchasing an international round-trip ticket for an 
upcoming trip to Asia. Using the experimental paradigm 
described in the previous section, we instructed participants 
to examine a set of nine flight options and then choose their 
preferred option in each of 36 pairs. We determined the 
degree of preference consistency for each participant by 
computing the number of transitivity violations present in 
these choices.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three con 
ditions—control, money, and time. In all three conditions, 
each flight option was represented by a service rating (1-5 
stars) and an in-flight entertainment rating (1-5 stars); how 
ever, in addition to these two attributes, participants in the 
money condition were given the fare of each flight option, 
while participants in the time condition were given the aver 
age one-way flight duration of each flight option. The air 
fares ranged from $1,150 to $1,553, while the flight dura 
tion of the nine options ranged from 19 hours and 10 
minutes (1,150 minutes) to 25 hours and 53 minutes (1,553 
minutes).
If we indeed observe different degrees of preference con 
sistency across conditions, an alternative explanation is that 
some participants may experience greater difficulty when 
making their decisions and thus are more prone to decision 
uncertainty and choice fluctuation. To examine this possi 
bility, we asked participants to rate how easy or difficult 
they perceived the choice task to be after they had made 
their choices (1 = “very easy,” and 7 = “very difficult”). In 
addition, we captured a more objective measure of decision 
difficulty—the amount of time each participant took to 
complete the choice task.
Results. A  comparison of the number of intransitivity 
cycles using analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed differ-
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ent degrees of transitivity violations across the three condi 
tions (F(2, 163) = 5.31,/? = .006) (see Figure 1). Planned 
contrasts further showed that participants in the money con 
dition committed significantly more transitivity violations 
(Mm = 4.33, SD = 4.05) than participants in either the time 
condition (Mt = 2.85, SD = 3.54; t( 163) = 2.24,/? = .027) or 
the control condition (Mc = 2.18, SD = 2.76; t(163) = 3.19, 
p = .002). Participants in the time and control conditions, 
however, did not differ statistically in the number of transi 
tivity violations they made (/? = .309).3
Participants in the money condition (Mm = 158.09 sec 
onds, SD = 79.26 seconds) and the time condition (Mt = 
154.55 seconds, SD = 69.91 seconds) took significantly 
more time to make their choices than those in the control 
condition (Mc = 99.95 seconds, SD = 48.63 seconds; both 
p  < .001; overall ANOVA,F(l, 163) = 13.03,/? < .001; post 
hoc comparisons based on Fisher’s least square difference 
test). In addition, participants in the money (Mm = 3.35, SD =
1.45) and time (Mt = 3.27, SD = 1.64) conditions rated the 
choice task to be marginally more difficult than those in the 
control condition (Mc = 2.76, SD = 1.56; p = .055 and /? = 
.084, respectively; overall ANOVA: F (l, 163) = 2.27 p = 
.107). These differences are not surprising given that par 
ticipants in the control condition had fewer attributes to 
assess. Importantly, despite making different numbers of 
intransitivity errors on average, participants in the money 
and time conditions did not differ in how long they took to 
make their choices (mean difference = 3.44 seconds, critical 
difference = 25.16 seconds,/? = .788) or how easy/difficult 
they perceived the choice task to be (mean difference = .08, 
critical difference = .59,/? = .801). Controlling for either 
variable in the main intransitivity-cycle analysis also did not 
alter the main substantive results (both p < .038).
Discussion. The results of Experiment 1 provide initial 
evidence that product choices are less consistent when
3To account for potential overdispersion in the count data (Gardner, 
Mulvey, and Shaw 1995), we also analyzed the transitivity data using nega 
tive binomial regressions in all the experiments. These analyses did not 
produce qualitatively different results from the ones using t-tests and 
ANOVAs that we report herein. Furthermore, while we have assumed 
equal variances across conditions in all our contrast analyses, assuming 
unequal variances did not change the qualitative conclusions of our find 
ings either.
Figure 1
COMPARISON OF TRANSITIVITY VIOLATIONS (EXPERIMENT 1)
5  - i
Control Money Time
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money is involved in the evaluation of product attributes 
than when time is involved. Moreover, both the objective 
decision time measures and the subjective choice difficulty 
ratings indicate that the observed differences in preference 
consistency across the three conditions cannot be fully 
accounted for by any objective or perceived differences in 
the difficulty of the choice task.
Experiment 2: Choosing Software Packages—A 
Replication
Objective and method. Our goal in Experiment 2 was to 
replicate the difference in preference consistency found in 
Experiment 1 using an alternative approach to manipulate 
the consideration of money or time in product choice. 
Specifically, unlike Experiment 1, participants across all 
conditions in this experiment were shown all four attributes, 
and whether the attribute values varied or remained constant 
across options depended on the condition to which partici 
pants were assigned. The intent was to present participants 
with the same set of attributes across conditions and, at the 
same time, induce participants to place less weight on the 
attribute that did not help differentiate the options. In addi 
tion, in this experiment, we used a different set of choice 
stimuli and included more questions to measure partici 
pants’ perception of the task.
A total of 78 English-speaking students from a university 
in Singapore were asked to imagine that they had to pur 
chase software to create photo essays for an important 
school project. They were first shown a set of nine software 
options described by four attributes (software features [1-5 
stars], software quality [1-5 stars], setup time, and price) 
and asked to examine the assortment, one option at a time. 
They were then presented with pairs of software options and 
had to choose their preferred option in each pair.
As in Experiment 1, this experiment included three con 
ditions: participants were randomly assigned to the control 
condition, the money condition, or the time condition. In the 
control condition, only the features and quality ratings dif 
fered across software options, while setup time and price 
were held constant; in the money condition, setup time was 
held constant, while all other attributes varied across 
options; and in the time condition, price was held constant, 
while all other attributes varied across options. In this 
experiment, we also wanted to control for the nominal mag 
nitudes of software price and setup time. Thus, we used the 
same nominal values for both setup time and price; the 
prices of the nine software options ranged from $5 to $45 at 
increasing intervals of $5, while the setup time ranged from 
5 minutes to 45 minutes at increasing intervals of 5 minutes.
After making their product choices, participants rated 
how easy or difficult they perceived the choice task to be 
(1 = “very easy,” and 7 = “very difficult”). In addition, we 
asked them to rate how similar or different they thought the 
software options were from one another (1 = “very similar,” 
and 7 = “very different”), as well as how informative they 
found the attribute information (1 = “not at all informative,” 
and 7 = “very informative”). We included these measures so 
that we could examine whether perceived variability in soft 
ware options or perceived informativeness of attribute infor 
mation might serve as an alternative account for any prefer 
ence consistency differences across conditions. Finally, asNotes: Error bars denote standard errors.
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in Experiment 1, we recorded the time taken to complete the 
choice task.
Results. Consistent with the basic result pattern found in 
Experiment 1, participants in the money condition (Mm = 
5.96, SD = 5.97) committed significantly more transitivity 
violations than participants in the control condition (Mc = 
2.92, SD = 3.46; t(75) = 2.50, p = .015) and time condition 
(Mt = 3.59, SD = 3.14; t(75) = 1.97, p = .053; overall 
ANOVA: F (2 ,75) = 3.44, p = .037). As before, participants 
in the time condition and the control condition did not differ 
in the number of transitivity violations they committed (p = 
.576).
Again, similar to the results of Experiment 1, there was 
an overall significant difference in the amount of time par 
ticipants took to make their choices across conditions (F(2, 
75) = 5.64, p  = .005). Specifically, decision times were sig 
nificantly longer in the money condition (Mm = 171.28 sec 
onds, SD = 62.58 seconds) and the time condition (Mt = 
173.94 seconds, SD = 71.60 seconds) than in the control 
condition (Mc = 122.35 seconds, SD = 51.06 seconds; both 
ps < .008). In contrast, participants in the money and time 
conditions did not differ in how long they took to decide 
(p  = .879). Unlike the results of Experiment 1, participants 
across conditions did not differ statistically in their per 
ceived difficulty of the choice task (F(2, 75) = .21, p = 
.814).
Furthermore, there was no significant difference across 
conditions in the perceived informativeness of attribute 
information (Mc = 3.92, SD = 1.70; Mm = 3.44, SD = 1.53; 
M,. = 4.11, SD = 1.55; F (2 ,75) = 1.21 ,p =  .303) or the per 
ceived variability of the nine software options (Mc = 4.50, 
SD = 1.48; Mm = 4.08, SD = 1.29; Mt = 4.30, SD = 1.14; 
F(2, 75) = .66,p = .520).
Discussion. In summary, this experiment replicated the 
findings in Experiment 1 using a different product category 
and a different approach to manipulate the focus on money 
versus time during product choice, demonstrating again that 
preferences formed on the basis of money considerations 
are less consistent than those formed on the basis of tempo 
ral considerations. The results of the various additional 
measures further indicate that the transitivity results cannot 
be fully explained by any differences in perceived or experi 
enced difficulty of the decision task or by any differences in 
perceived variability or attribute informativeness of the 
software options across conditions.
While we have tried to rule out differences in decision 
difficulty as a potential alternative explanation using these 
various additional measures, two other possibilities remain. 
First, participants may have perceived greater ambiguity in 
the value of time (Okada and Hoch 2004), and conse 
quently, they may have simplified the decision process by 
reducing the importance of the time attribute or disregard 
ing the time attribute altogether, thereby leading to more 
consistent preferences. Alternatively, participants may have 
simply cared less when the choice options involved money 
than when they involved time (although not likely given the 
participant population of college students), leading them to 
take the task less seriously and, consequently, to make more 
random errors.
The lack of a significant difference in decision time and 
subjective choice difficulty in Experiments 1 and 2 casts 
doubt on these accounts. Furthermore, we analyzed and
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compared the specific choices participants made across con 
ditions in both experiments by comparing participants’ 
Kendall scores for each product—that is, the number of 
times they selected the product over the others (Cook and 
Kress 1992); the results indicated that participants had dif 
ferent product preferences across conditions (and between 
any pair of conditions) in both experiments (all ps < .001), 
further suggesting that participants in neither the money 
condition nor the time condition were simply ignoring the 
given money or time information when making their deci 
sions. Nonetheless, in the following experiment, we address 
these concerns more fully by examining the decision 
weights that participants placed on the money and time 
attributes relative to other attributes.
Experiment 3: Decision Weights and an Alternative 
Measure o f Preference Consistency
Objectives and method. We designed Experiment 3 with 
three objectives in mind. First, we wanted to examine 
whether the observed differences in preference consistency 
between the money and time conditions are caused by par 
ticipants in one condition weighing the focal resource 
(money or time) significantly more than participants in the 
other condition. We accomplished this in two ways: (1) 
directly, by having participants rate (after the choice task) 
how important each attribute was to their choice decisions, 
and (2) indirectly, by imputing participants’ decision 
weights on the focal attributes based on their choices and 
comparing these weights across conditions.
Second, to lend greater confidence to our choice of transi 
tivity as a measure of preference consistency, we attempted 
to replicate the basic effect using an additional dependent 
measure. Specifically, we had participants rate the nine 
product options on the basis of how much they liked them 
and then computed the rank-order correlation between the 
ratings-imputed ranks and choice-imputed ranks. We then 
compared this rank-order correlation across conditions.
Third, we wanted to further test the robustness of our 
basic effect by using a different set of product stimuli. One 
might argue that the flights and software stimuli we used in 
the previous experiments are rather impoverished. There 
fore, we employed richer product descriptions for options in 
a different product category: vacation resorts. Along with 
several numerical attributes (food rating [1-5 stars], activi 
ties rating [1-5 stars], price, duration of stay), each vacation 
resort was also represented by a name, a color picture, and a 
short qualitative description.
A total of 139 respondents from Amazon.com’s Mechani 
cal Turk (MTurk) participated in this experiment for a fee. 
Three respondents indicated in a postexperiment question 
naire that they had participated in a similar study before, 
and one respondent took an unusually long time to complete 
the choice task (more than three standard deviations above 
the mean). We excluded these respondents from the analy 
sis, giving us an effective sample size of 135.4
Using the experimental paradigm described in the 
“Overview of the Experiments” section, we instructed partici-
4The main pattern of results remained statistically significant at the p  = 
.05 level when we included these participants. Unless otherwise stated, the 
same applies to the other experiments in which respondents were excluded 
from the data analysis.
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pants to imagine that they were planning a vacation during 
the upcoming summer and to carefully study nine vacation 
resorts. We used the same approach as in Experiment 2 to 
manipulate attention on money versus time. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: in the 
money condition, duration was held constant at the average 
duration of seven days, but price varied across resort 
options ($1,094-$3,890); in the time condition, price was 
held constant at the average amount of $2,400, but duration 
varied across resort options (3-11 days); and in the control 
condition, both price and duration were held constant across 
options.
Next, participants were presented with all possible pairs 
of options and were asked to choose their preferred option 
in each pair. After making their choices, in addition to rating 
perceived choice-task difficulty and product-options vari 
ability, participants were asked to rate on separate seven- 
point scales (1 = “not at all important,” and 7 = “very impor 
tant”) how important each of the attributes (food, activities, 
price, and duration) was to them when they made their 
choices. Finally, participants were shown the nine options 
again and were asked to rate how much they liked each 
option on a 0-100 sliding scale (with larger numbers corre 
sponding to greater liking). As in the two previous experi 
ments, we also measured the amount of time participants 
took to complete the choice task.
Results: preference consistency and control measures. 
The basic effect was again replicated; participants in the 
money condition (Mm = 4.32, SD = 6.07) committed signifi 
cantly more transitivity violations than participants in the 
control condition (Mc = 2.57, SD = 2.89; t( 132) = 2.03,p  = 
.044) or time condition (Mt = 2.07, SD = 2.60; t( 132) = 
2.52,p = .011; overall ANOVA: F(2, 132) = 3.55,p  = .031).
In contrast, participants in the time and control conditions 
did not differ in the number of transitivity violations they 
committed {p = .567).
We imputed participants’ preference orders for the nine 
options on the basis of their actual choices and postchoice 
ratings for how much they liked each option. We then com 
puted the rank-order correlation for the preference orders 
from these two methods and compared them across condi 
tions. Overall, we observed a significant difference in rank- 
order correlations across the three conditions (F(2, 132) = 
4.19,p =  .017). Planned contrasts further revealed that par 
ticipants in the money condition had significantly lower 
rank-order correlations (Mm = .64, SD = .36) than partici 
pants in the time condition (Mt = .79, SD = .21; t( 132) = 
2.76, p  = .007) or control condition (Mc = .75, SD = .20; 
t( 132) = 2.15,p = .033). However, the time and control con 
ditions did not differ significantly in rank-order correlations 
(p  = .480). Thus, this analysis revealed a pattern of results 
that mirrored the transitivity results. Importantly, lending 
support to the notion that these alternative measures of pref 
erence consistency pertain to the same construct, there was 
a significant negative correlation between the number of 
intransitivity errors that participants made in the choice task 
and their rank-order correlations (r = -.65, p < .001): the 
more consistent participants were in their imputed rankings 
(choice-based and ratings-based), the more transitive their 
choices were.
Comparing the decision times across conditions revealed 
an overall marginally significant difference (F(2, 132) =
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2.34, p = .101), with participants in both the money condi 
tion (Mm = 195.28 seconds, SD = 98.02 seconds) and the 
time condition (Mt = 194.47 seconds, SD = 63.23 seconds) 
taking more time to make their choices than participants in 
the control condition (Mc = 164.42 seconds, SD = 70.99 
seconds; both p < .072). However, participants in the money 
condition and the time condition did not differ in the 
amount of time they took to decide (p = .962). Furthermore, 
participants across the three conditions did not differ statis 
tically in how difficult they perceived the choice task to be 
(F(2,132) = .36,p = .698) or how similar they perceived the 
different options to be (F(2, 132) = .61 ,p =  .543). Again, 
these results indicate that neither objective nor subjective 
decision difficulty can fully account for the main preference 
consistency results.
Results: subjective decision weights. As we expected, and 
validating the money/time consideration manipulation, par 
ticipants in the money condition and time condition placed 
more weight on duration and price, respectively, when mak 
ing their choices (see Figure 2). Self-reported decision 
weights on price were significantly different across condi 
tions (F(2, 132) = 8.95,p < .001), with participants in the 
money condition placing more weight on price in their deci 
sions (Mm = 5.46, SD = 1.75) than participants in both the 
time condition (M, = 4.41, SD = 1.94; t( 132) = 2.53, p  = 
.013) and the control condition (Mc = 3.78, SD = 2.05; 
t( 132) = 4.21 ,p  < .001). Likewise, there was an overall sig 
nificant difference in self-reported decision weights on 
duration across conditions (F(2, 132) = 22.80, p < .001), 
with participants in the time condition placing more weight 
on duration in their decisions (Mt = 5.95, SD = 1.27) than 
participants in both the money condition (Mm = 4.34, SD = 
1.66; p < .001) and the control condition (Mc = 3.53, SD = 
2.08; p < .001). However, there was no significant differ 
ence in the importance weights participants placed on food 
(F(2, 132) = 1.48,p  = .232) or activities (F(2, 132) = 1.51, 
p -  .225) across conditions. Importantly, the importance 
weight placed on the focal attribute (i.e., the importance 
weight placed on price for participants in the money condition
Figure 2
COMPARISON OF SELF-REPORTED ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTS IN 
VACATION DECISIONS (EXPERIMENT 3)
Very
Not at All Activities Food Duration Price Focal 
Important
Notes: Error bars denote standard errors, and the asterisk indicates sig 
nificant differences across conditions (p < .001). The rightmost “Focal” bar 
refers to duration in the time condition and price in the money condition.
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and the importance weight placed on duration for participants 
in the time condition) was not statistically different (t(84) = 
1.51,p  = .135), indicating that participants in the money and 
time conditions weighed their respective focal-resource 
attribute similarly.5 We also note that the main transitivity 
results remained significant after controlling for the vari 
ance of participants’ decision weights across attributes (F(2, 
131) = 3.26,/? = .042). An examination of the distribution of 
decision weights across conditions shows that the variance 
of participants’ decisions weights also did not differ signifi 
cantly across conditions (F (2 ,132) = 1.88,/? = .157).
Results: choice-imputed decision weights. To obtain fur 
ther evidence that our preference consistency results cannot 
simply be accounted for by a difference in decision weights 
placed on the focal attribute between participants in the 
money condition and those in the time condition, we ana 
lyzed participants’ imputed decision weights on the various 
attributes based on their actual choices (for methodological 
details of the analysis, see the Appendix). The analysis 
revealed that participants in the money and time conditions 
did not differ significantly in their imputed relative weights 
on the focal attribute (t(72) = -1.20 ,p  = .233). Furthermore, 
the main preference consistency result—that participants in 
the money condition committed more transitivity violations 
than those in the time condition—remained significant after 
controlling for the imputed relative standardized weight 
(focal attribute/food) on the focal attribute (t(71) = 2.21, 
p  =. 030).
Discussion. Taken together, the results of this experiment 
provide further support for the robustness of the main pref 
erence consistency effect by (1) replicating the effect using 
an alternative measure of preference consistency, (2) 
demonstrating that it generalizes to more enriched product 
stimuli with pictorial and verbal descriptive information, 
and (3) ruling out an alternative account that suggests that 
the decision weights placed on the focal attribute may have 
been different between the money and the time conditions, 
through analyzing participants’ self-reported decision 
weights as well as their imputed weights derived from the 
actual choices that they made. We also did not find evidence 
for greater use of heuristic processing with considerations 
of time than of money in the choice task (cf. Saini and 
Monga 2008).
Experiments 1-3 demonstrate the basic finding that 
money consideration results in less preference consistency 
than time consideration. As we discussed previously, prior 
work suggests that thinking about money (vs. time) leads to 
greater analytical processing and less focus on more affec 
tive constructs. At the same time, analytical processing 
leads to lower preference consistency than affective pro 
cessing. Taken together, these findings suggest that the criti 
cal difference between considering product options that 
include a price attribute and options with a time attribute 
may lie in the distinct processing modes that these resources
Analyzing participants’ standardized weights revealed the same pattern 
of results: there was no significant difference in the standardized importance 
weight placed on the focal attribute—that is, between the standardized 
importance weight placed on duration for participants in the time condition 
(Mt = .33, SD = .64) and the standardized importance weight placed on 
price for participants in the money condition (Mm = .36, SD = .64; t(84) = 
.15, p =  .878).
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evoke spontaneously. We test this proposition in the next 
three experiments.
EXAMINING THE UNDERLYING PROCESS 
Experiment 4: The Ratio-Bias Paradigm
Objective and method. In Experiment 4, we sought evi 
dence for the different modes of processing that we propose 
to accompany considerations of money and time. Specifi 
cally, we employed a popular paradigm in the literature to 
distinguish analytical and affective processing, namely, the 
ratio-bias paradigm (Avnet, Pham, and Stephen 2012; 
Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994; Kirkpatrick and Epstein 
1992). As we discussed, analytical processing involves logi 
cal reasoning and is more piecemeal in nature; individuals 
operating in this mode are more likely to rely on probabili 
ties or ratios. In contrast, affective processing is associated 
with more feeling-based or holistic processing; individuals 
operating in this mode respond more readily to frequencies 
rather than probabilities (Denes-Raj, Epstein, and Cole 
1995; Epstein 1994; Pacini and Epstein 1999). The ratio- 
bias paradigm was developed on the basis of these specific 
defining associations.
The logic of Experiment 4 is as follows; if greater analyt 
ical (vs. affective) processing indeed characterizes how 
monetary information is processed compared with time 
information, we should be able to detect spillover effects of 
that processing mode on a subsequent task: the choice task 
used in the ratio-bias paradigm.
A total of 131 respondents from MTurk participated in 
this study for a customary fee. Three respondents indicated 
in a postexperiment questionnaire that they had participated 
in a similar study before, two respondents indicated that 
they were color-blind (thus preventing them from complet 
ing the ratio-bias task), and one respondent took an unusu 
ally long time (more than three standard deviations above 
the mean) to complete the task. We excluded these respon 
dents from the analysis, giving us an effective sample size 
of 125.
We used the same vacation resorts stimuli and manipula 
tion as in Experiment 3. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three conditions—control, money, and time —to 
complete the two-stage binary choice task. After making 
their choices, participants were asked to play a hypothetical 
game of chance in the guise of a purportedly unrelated study 
in which they had to choose between two bowls that con 
tained a mix of red and white jelly beans (Avnet, Pham, and 
Stephen 2012; Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994). One jelly bean 
would then be picked at random from the chosen bowl. If a 
red jelly bean was picked, they would earn a $5 reward; if a 
white jelly bean was picked, they would not earn anything. 
We designed the task such that one bowl contained 1 red 
jelly bean and 11 white jelly beans (small bowl), while the 
other contained 6 red jelly beans and 80 white jelly beans 
(large bowl). The larger bowl, while containing more jelly 
beans overall, features a smaller probability of picking a red 
jelly bean (approximately a 7.0% chance) compared with 
the small bowl (approximately an 8.3% chance). Epstein 
and others (e.g., Avnet, Pham, and Stephen 2012; Denes-Raj 
and Epstein 1994) demonstrate in studies using this para 
digm that individuals who approach the problem with an 
analytical mindset draw on knowledge of ratios and proba-
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bilities to conclude that the small bowl is the superior 
choice, whereas people whose choices are guided more by 
affect tend to focus on frequencies and choose instead the 
large bowl. Thus, we reason that if participants completed 
the resort choice task by relying more on analytical process 
ing, this processing mode would spill over to the jelly bean 
task and would show up as a tendency to choose the smaller 
bowl.
Results and discussion. Participants in the money condi 
tion (Mm = 3.29, SD = 3.66) committed significantly more 
transitivity violations than participants in the control (Mc =
1.86, SD = 2.83; t( 122),/? = .037) and time (Mt = 1.43,SD = 
2.44; t(122),/? = .005; overall ANOVA: F(2, 122) = 4.49, 
p = .013) conditions. In contrast, participants in the time 
condition and the control condition did not differ in the 
number of transitivity violations they committed (/? = .539). 
These results replicate the findings of Experiments 1-3.
Importantly, as we predicted, participants in the money 
condition were significantly less likely (20.4%) to choose 
the larger bowl of jelly beans than those in both the control 
(47.2%; z = 2.62,/? = .009) and time (40.0%; z = 2.02,/? = 
.043) conditions. The proportions in the time and control 
conditions did not differ (/? = .527). Thus, participants in the 
money condition evidently relied more on analytical pro 
cessing to arrive at their choices than participants in the 
other two conditions. Together, these results suggest that 
choices that involve money consideration and choices that 
involve time consideration activate qualitatively different 
modes of processing, resulting in different degrees of pref 
erence consistency.
Experiment 5: Processing Modes and Effect Mediation
Objective and method. In Experiment 5, we provide further 
evidence for the link between the different processing modes 
that money and time activate and preference consistency by 
means of a mediation test and by using an alternative 
experimental procedure. Specifically, instead of inducing 
considerations of money versus time by varying the product 
attributes in a choice task, we primed participants to think 
about money or time in an ostensibly unrelated survey 
before the choice task.
We recruited a total of 198 students at a university in Sin 
gapore to participate in this experiment in exchange for 
course credit. Three participants took an unusually short 
time to complete the experiment (more than three standard 
deviations below the mean), and three participants showed 
no variation in their responses to the postchoice survey. We 
excluded these participants from the analysis, giving us an 
effective sample size of 192.6
Participants were randomly assigned to the money or time 
condition. We used the same flight stimuli as in Experiment 
1, except that in this study, we kept the attributes (service 
rating [1-5 stars], in-flight entertainment rating [1-5 stars], 
flight duration, and airfare) identical across conditions and 
instead primed the salience of the money or time attribute 
using a separate task. Participants first completed a survey
6The main pattern of results remained significant at the p  =  .05 level 
after including the three participants who showed no variation in their 
responses. However, the main preference consistency finding became non 
significant after including the three participants who took an unusually 
short time to complete the experiment (p = .134).
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on “recreational activities”: in the money (time) condition, 
participants were asked to indicate the type of recreational 
activities they typically engaged in, the average amount of 
money (time) per week they spent on these activities, the 
average amount of money (time) per week they thought the 
typical individual spent on these activities, and any thoughts 
they might have pertaining to the money (time) they spent 
on these activities. Next, in a purportedly unrelated task, 
participants completed the two-stage binary flight choice 
task. We expect that the greater salience of money versus 
time considerations that the first survey primed would carry 
over to the choice task.
After participants completed the choice task, they were 
asked to complete a short survey in which they rated the 
perceived difficulty of the choice task, perceived variability 
of the flight options, and perceived informativeness of the 
given product attributes. More importantly, participants 
indicated how much they relied on their feelings versus 
logical considerations when choosing (1 = “feelings only,” 
and 7 = “logical considerations only”), thus enabling us to 
tap into different processing modes activated in the choice 
task. At the end of the study, as a final exploratory question 
to determine whether participants could intuit how (in)con- 
sistent their choices were, we briefly explained the concept 
of transitivity and then asked them to rate how transitive 
they thought their choices were (1 = “not at all transitive,” 
and 7 = “very transitive”).
Results. Consistent with the results in the earlier experi 
ments, participants in the money condition (Mm = 8.97, SD = 
7.28) committed significantly more transitivity violations 
than those in the time condition (Mt = 6.90, SD = 6.26; 
t( 190) = 2.06,/? = .037). Participants in the money condition 
(Mm = 5.09, SD = 1.36) also reported relying relatively less 
on feelings than on logical considerations while making 
their decisions compared with participants in the time con 
dition (Mt = 4.64, SD = 1.33; t(190) = 2.34,/? = .020).
More important, this differential reliance on logical con 
siderations versus feelings fully mediated the effect of prim 
ing money versus time on preference consistency. Preacher 
and Hayes’s (2008) SPSS macro with 5,000 bootstrapped 
samples revealed indirect-only mediation (Zhao, Lynch, and 
Chen 2010). Controlling for resource priming, we found 
that reliance on logical considerations over feelings was 
positively associated with the number of transitivity viola 
tions (B = .76, t( 189) = 2.09,/? = .038). Controlling for 
reliance on logical considerations over feelings, we found 
that the direct effect of resource priming (time = 0, money = 
1) on the number of transitivity violations failed to reach 
significance (B = 1.72, t(189) = 1.74,/? = .083). The indirect 
path (B = .35) had a 95% confidence interval that did not 
include 0 (.04, .93).
Neither the total amount of time that participants took to 
choose (Mm = 216.77 seconds, SD = 111.24 seconds vs. Mt = 
200.94 seconds, SD = 112.06 seconds; t( 189) = .98,/? = 
.327) nor the perceived difficulty of the choice task (Mm = 
3.84,SD= 1.56 vs. Mt = 4.16, SD = 1.51; t( 190) = 1.46,/? = 
.147) was significantly different across conditions. Simi 
larly, we did not find any significant differences on the 
measures of perceived variability of flight options (Mm = 
4.04, SD = 1.39 vs. Mt = 4.20, SD = 1.40; t(190) = .80,/? = 
.424) or perceived informativeness of attribute information 
(Mm = 4.85, SD = 1.54 vs. Mt = 4.59, SD = 1.49; t(190) =
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1.20, p  = .234). Notably, the participants’ perceptions of 
(in)transitivity did not differ between the two conditions 
(Mm = 4.11, SD = 1.32 vs. Mt = 4.12, SD = 1.45; t(190) = 
.02, p = .981), even though their choices showed otherwise.
Discussion. Overall, the results of Experiment 5 provide 
further support for the different processing modes that the 
consideration of money and time activates. We find that the 
differential reliance on logical reasoning versus feelings 
plays a mediating role in accounting for the less consistent 
preferences found with money consideration. Furthermore, 
we continued to rule out several alternative accounts (e.g., 
choice difficulty, perceived variability of options, attribute 
informativeness of choice options), while suggesting that 
individuals may not be cognizant of the degree of (in)transi- 
tivity of their choices.
Experiment 6: Mere Consideration o f Money Versus 
Experience
Objective and method. In Experiment 6, we sought fur 
ther support for the prediction that the difference in prefer 
ence consistency observed in the money and time condi 
tions is caused by the activation of different processing 
modes. If money consideration impairs preference consis 
tency because it activates greater analytical processing, then 
prompting participants to think about prices should lead to 
less consistent choices than prompting them to think about 
the experiential, more affective aspects of consuming the 
products.
A total of 174 students recruited at two universities in the 
United States were first shown the pictures of 10 T-shirts 
differing in color and design. They were then asked to make 
45 separate choices, one for each possible pair of T-shirts. 
However, instead of providing participants with a money or 
time attribute in the product descriptions as in the earlier 
experiments, we gave them specific instructions that directed 
their decision process. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of three conditions. In the money condition, we asked 
participants to consider “how much each T-shirt would 
cost” when choosing between T-shirts. In the experience 
condition, participants considered instead “how it would 
feel to wear each T-shirt.” A pretest (n = 34) verified that 
both factors are similarly important in T-shirt decisions (p = 
.466) and should therefore generate comparable decision 
difficulty. The control condition contained no additional 
instructions.
Results and discussion. A one-way ANOVA with three 
levels revealed a significant difference in transitivity viola 
tions across conditions (F (2 ,171) = 3.04,p -  .051). Planned 
contrasts further revealed that participants in the money 
condition (Mm = 2.63, SD = 3.50) committed more transitiv 
ity violations than those in the experience (Me = 1.49, SD = 
2.36; t(171),p = .034) and control (Mc = 1.50, SD = 2.58; 
t(171),p = .035) conditions, with no difference between the 
two latter conditions (p = .987). There was, however, no sig 
nificant difference in decision time across conditions (p = 
.154). Thus, the results support the hypothesis that the con 
sideration of money involves more analytical than affective 
processing, resulting in less transitive preferences.
Thus far, all the experiments have shown that preferences 
are less transitive under money consideration than under 
time consideration. Notably, in every experiment that 
included a control condition, we found null differences
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between the time and the control conditions in terms of 
preference consistency, while the money condition yielded 
consistently lower relative levels of consistency. In the 
remaining two experiments, we focus exclusively on exam 
ining the mechanism that underlies the lower preference 
consistency that money consideration generates, departing 
from comparing between money consideration and time 
consideration.
EXAMINING THE PREFERENCE INCONSISTENCY IN 
MONEY CONSIDERATION: THE MULTIPLE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF PRICE
In Experiments 1-6, we established that the consideration 
of money during product choice prompts greater analytical 
processing and less affective processing than the considera 
tion of time, and consequently, the consideration of money 
results in lower preference consistency than the considera 
tion of time. We posit that analytical processing is piece 
meal in nature and involves cognitive elaboration (Epstein 
1994; Epstein and Pacini 1999). When this cognitive elabo 
ration involves a concept associated with multiple potential 
interpretations, the “cognitive noise” that results hurts pref 
erence consistency.
Specifically, prior work on price perception suggests that 
price information is associated with multiple meanings that 
can be conceptualized as either negative or positive (Erickson 
and Johansson 1985; Lichtenstein, Ridgway, and Netemeyer 
1993). On the one hand, price carries a negative meaning 
when higher prices deter people from buying (Prelec and 
Loewenstein 1998; Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008). 
This occurs when price is viewed as the sacrifice of acquir 
ing desired goods. From this perspective, consumers are 
encouraged to reduce spending because they understand that 
current payments limit future utility from foregone options. 
On the other hand, price carries a positive meaning when 
higher prices encourage consumers to buy. This occurs 
when price serves as an indicator of product quality —the 
belief that “one gets what one pays for” (Rao and Monroe
1989) . Moreover, higher prices may also encourage spend 
ing by signaling positive information to the self and others. 
For example, consumers may spend more to promote a 
sense of self-worth (Lichtenstein, Netemeyer, and Burton
1990) or to enhance their social standing through displaying 
wealth and status (Amaldoss and Jain 2005).
Given these different meanings, price is therefore open to 
different and conflicting interpretations. Accordingly, when 
consumers evaluate products with price as an attribute, they 
can interpret price in different ways across decisions or 
product choice occasions, and therefore, the mapping between 
price and utility is imprecise (Amir, Ariely, and Carmon 
2008; Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2003). Consequently, 
the greater analytical processing that money consideration 
triggers generates greater cognitive noise and lowers prefer 
ence consistency. Conversely, when the interpretation of 
price is constrained to a specific meaning and thus reducing 
the amount of cognitive noise, the negative impact of price 
on preference consistency should be attenuated. We exam 
ine this mechanism in the final two experiments.
Experiment 7: Priming Different Meanings o f Price
Objective and method. In Experiment 7, we posit that 
across choice occasions, people might interpret price in
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opposing ways that impair preference consistency and that 
priming a single interpretation of price ameliorates this 
problem.
We randomly assigned 137 participants recruited at a uni 
versity in the United States to one of four conditions. In the 
learning stage, participants saw pictures; prices (from $199.99 
to $376.99); and information on brand, model, resolution, 
zoom, and screen size of ten digital cameras. In the control 
and money conditions, participants chose the camera they 
would buy in each of 45 possible pairs. In the money- 
expense condition, participants were further asked to imag 
ine that given recent expenditures, they hoped to exercise 
restraint and avoid overspending. In the money-quality con 
dition, participants were told that they were buying an 
anniversary gift for their parents and, given the occasion, 
hoped to purchase a camera that their parents could use for 
many years to come. We expected participants in these two 
conditions to have more specific interpretations of price and 
thus to commit fewer violations of transitivity than partici 
pants in the money condition. All participants except those 
in the control condition were shown prices during the deci 
sion stage. In addition to the participants’ choices, we meas 
ured the amount of time participants took to complete the 
choice task.
Results and discussion. A  one-way ANOVA with four levels 
revealed that the average number of transitivity violations 
differed across conditions (F(3, 133) = 2.73, p  = .047; see 
Figure 3). Planned contrasts revealed that participants in the 
money condition (Mm = 6.58, SD = 5.83) again committed 
more violations than participants in the control condition 
(Mc = 3.97, SD = 4.37; t( 133) = 2.31, p  = .023). More 
important, whereas participants in the money-expense (Mme = 
3.68, SD = 3.49) and in the money-quality (Mmq = 4.62, SD = 
4.72) conditions performed similarly to participants in the 
control condition (/? -  .799 and p = .574; respectively), they 
committed fewer violations than participants in the money 
condition (t(133) = 2.59, p =  .011, and t(133) = 1.75,/? = 
.083, respectively).
With respect to time spent in the decision stage, we found 
an overall difference across conditions (F (3 ,133) = 3.82,/? = 
.012). Participants in the money (Mm = 176.3 seconds, SD =
Figure 3
COMPARISON OF TRANSITIVITY VIOLATIONS WHEN 
DIFFERENT CONSUMPTION GOALS ARE PRIMED 
(EXPERIMENT 7)
8 -l
Control Money Money- Money- 
Quality Expense
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101.8 seconds; p = .126) and money-expense (Mme = 166.1 
seconds, SD = 67.9 seconds; p  = .300) conditions took com 
parable amounts of time to complete the choice task as par 
ticipants in the control condition (Mc =143.4 seconds, SD = 
45.7 seconds). Participants in the money-quality condition 
(Mmq = 215.5 seconds, SD = 120.7 seconds) took signifi 
cantly more time to choose than those in the control condi 
tion (/? = .001). Note, however, that the differing degrees of 
transitivity violations cannot be attributed simply to the dif 
ferent amounts of time (and presumably effort) taken in the 
various conditions, given the very different patterns of find 
ings for the two measures. In particular, decision time in the 
money-quality condition was longer than in the control con 
dition, but decision time in the money-expense condition 
was comparable to that in the control condition; yet the 
number of transitivity violations in these two treatment con 
ditions did not differ significantly from that in the control 
condition. In contrast, decision time in the money condition 
was comparable to that in the control condition, but the 
number of transitivity violations was significantly higher in 
the money condition than in the control condition.
Experiment 8: Prompting Different Meanings o f Price
Objective and method. In Experiment 8, we provide fur 
ther support for the role of multiple interpretations of price 
in driving preference inconsistency. Instead of inducing par 
ticipants to adopt a particular interpretation of price by pro 
viding them with a goal, we directed some of the partici 
pants to pay attention to a particular meaning or to multiple 
meanings of price, thus making one or more meanings of 
price more salient.
A total of 192 participants were recruited from MTurk to 
complete a short task on decision making for a customary 
fee. We used the same stimuli and choice task as in Experi 
ment 7. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 
five conditions. When choosing between pairs of digital 
cameras, participants in the money-quality condition were 
asked to consider that “in general, the more expensive a 
product, the better its quality.” Those in the money-expense 
condition were asked instead to consider that “in general, 
the more expensive a product, the less money one has to buy 
other products that one desires.” Those in the money-mixed 
condition were asked to consider both meanings of price: 
“in general, the more expensive a product, the better its 
quality, but the less money one has to buy other products 
that one desires.” The control and money conditions were 
the same as in Experiment 7, such that participants did not 
receive additional information beyond instructions for the 
choice task.
Results. A one-way ANOVA with five levels indicated that 
participants committed significantly different numbers of 
transitivity violations across conditions (F(4,187) = 5.35,/? < 
.001; see Figure 4). Planned contrasts further revealed that 
participants in the money condition (Mm = 9.80, SD = 10.50) 
made significantly more transitivity violations than those in 
the control condition (Mc = 3.52, SD = 4.64; t( 187) = 3.26, 
p = .001). More important, consistent with the argument that 
money consideration impedes consistent choice behavior 
because of the different interpretations of price that might 
be cued in product decisions, participants in the money- 
mixed condition (Mn,m = 9.67, SD = 10.37) made signifi 
cantly more transitivity violations than those in the controlNotes: Error bars denote standard errors.
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Figure 4
COMPARISON OF TRANSITIVITY VIOLATIONS WHEN 
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF PRICE ARE MADE 
SALIENT (EXPERIMENT 8)
Notes: Error bars denote standard errors.
condition (t( 187) = 3.23, p -  .001) but a similar number of 
violations as participants in the money condition (p = .940). 
Also in support of our argument, participants in both the 
money-expense (Mme = 5.97, SD = 6.32) and the money- 
quality (Mmq = 4.15, SD = 5.73) conditions, who were 
given one specific way to interpret price, made significantly 
fewer transitivity violations than participants in the money 
and money-mixed conditions (all p < .050) but a similar 
number of violations as participants in the control condition 
(both ps > .223).
Furthermore, the amount of time participants took to 
choose was marginally different across conditions (F(4, 
187) = 2.30, p = .060). Post hoc comparisons using Fisher’s 
test further revealed that participants in the money condition 
(Mm = 225.3 seconds, SD = 128.6 seconds) took significantly 
more time to make their choices than those in the control 
condition (Mc = 155.0 seconds, SD = 49.8 seconds,/? = .005). 
In contrast, the amount of time participants in the other 
three conditions took to choose did not differ significantly 
from the control condition (all ps > .100). Overall, the dif 
ferent patterns of the decision time results and the transitiv 
ity results suggest that the amount of time participants took 
to choose could not fully explain the transitivity findings.
Discussion. In summary, the results of this experiment 
indicate that while prompting participants to consider multi 
ple meanings of price did not improve preference consis 
tency, prompting them to think about price in a precise man 
ner reduced cognitive noise and led to more consistent 
preferences. Together with the results of Experiment 7, we 
have provided evidence that constraining the interpretation 
of price to a specific meaning, be it indirectly through 
prompting different consumption goals or directly by focus 
ing consumers’ attention on a particular meaning of price, 
improves preference consistency.
Furthermore, in two other experiments, we found that 
individuals who either display a high degree of price con 
sciousness (i.e., those who tend to regard price as a cost or 
sacrifice) or have a dispositional tendency to rely on the 
price-quality inference when evaluating products (Lichten 
stein, Ridgway, and Netemeyer 1993) are less susceptible to 
the negative influence of money consideration on prefer 
ence consistency. These studies suggest that there is hetero 
geneity across people in the degree of specificity attached to 
the meaning of price, providing convergent support for our 
hypothesis that it is the inherent ambiguity in the meaning 
of price (which accompanies the analytical processing of 
monetary consideration) that underlies the negative impact 
of money consideration on preference consistency.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Consumers make a variety of decisions in their everyday 
lives that involve money and time considerations. A growing 
body of research points to distinct psychological correlates 
associated with money and with time. We add to this litera 
ture by examining the fundamental modes of processing 
that the consideration of money and time trigger and a deci 
sion context that consumers frequently encounter—namely, 
choosing between product options where the price or time 
duration associated with each option is under consideration.
Money is fundamentally an instrument of exchange. The 
utilitarian use of money involves considerations of value, 
which evokes greater analytical thinking. In comparison, 
time is experienced; therefore, time consideration tends to 
activate related concepts that are experiential or affective in 
nature. If consumers were explicitly directed to think about 
money or time, it would be reasonable to expect that quali 
tatively different modes of processing would be activated 
and that this would then have different influences on behav 
ior or behavioral intent. What may be less obvious is 
whether these processing modes would be spontaneously 
triggered by the mere presentation of product options that 
have a money- or time-related attribute.
The findings of the experiments presented herein offer 
convergent evidence that a choice situation involving the 
consideration of money activates a more analytical mode of 
processing than a choice situation involving time, which 
activates instead a more affective mode. This distinction, in 
turn, affects the consistency of preferences, with the consid 
eration of money resulting in lower preference consistency. 
This finding is in line with other studies that have shown 
that analytical processing generates cognitive noise and 
impairs preference consistency both within (Lee, Amir, and 
Ariely 2009) and across (Pham et al. 2001) individuals.
Our main interest in this research was to ascertain the 
relative degree of analytical and affective processing that 
occurs with the consideration of money and time. We con 
sistently found that the money condition was significantly 
different from the control condition in terms of preference 
consistency, while the time condition was not. This suggests 
that it was processing in the money condition that impaired 
preference consistency rather than processing in the time 
condition that improved it. Therefore, in Experiments 7 and 
8, we sought to clarify what might be driving this money- 
inconsistency effect. The results of these two studies pro 
vide consistent support for our hypothesized mechanism. 
Specifically, when individuals evaluate products with price 
as an attribute, they can interpret price in different ways 
across decisions because price plays different roles across 
contexts (e.g., price as a signal of quality or status vs. price 
as an expense or sacrifice; Erickson and Johansson 1985; 
Lichtenstein, Ridgway, and Netemeyer 1993), and thus the 
mapping between price and utility is imprecise (Ariely, 
Loewenstein, and Prelec 2003; Amir, Ariely, and Carmon
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2008). Consequently, the greater analytical processing that 
money consideration triggers generates greater cognitive 
noise and leads to greater preference inconsistency. Con 
versely, when the interpretation of price is constrained to a 
specific meaning, whether by priming a consumption goal 
(Experiment 7) or by directing consumers to focus on a par 
ticular meaning of price (Experiment 8), the price-utility 
mapping becomes less noisy, and the negative impact of price 
on preference consistency is attenuated. We also want to high 
light that these results do not indicate that the inherent value 
of money is necessarily more ambiguous that the inherent 
value of time per se (cf. Okada and Hoch 2004). Rather, the 
combination of two factors —the analytical processing that 
money consideration evokes and the multiple meanings of 
price —seem to account for the negative impact of money 
consideration on preference consistency. Accordingly, 
because time consideration triggers a more affective mode 
of processing, it does not lead to preference inconsistency.
Furthermore, while our experiments demonstrate that 
money consideration leads to less transitive choices than 
time consideration by triggering greater analytical (vs. 
affective) processing, our objective in this work is not to 
draw a general conclusion about the relationship between 
analytical/affective processing and rational or normative 
behavior. Indeed, our findings show that depending on the 
choice context and the preference measure, greater analytical 
processing can result in either more normative behavior (as 
in the case of Experiment 4 with the ratio-bias paradigm) or, 
counterintuitively, less normative behavior (as in the assess 
ment of preference consistency in all our experiments).
Related Findings in the Literature on the Ambiguity of 
Time Versus Money
Contrary to our findings in the present work, one might 
expect that money consideration will lead to more consis 
tent preferences compared with time consideration. After 
all, decisions that involve money are encountered on a daily 
basis. One might therefore also presume that consumers are 
more adept at processing monetary information and, conse 
quently, are more consistent in their preferences. Indeed, 
when we asked 33 respondents in a brief survey how prices 
affect their purchase decisions, the consensus was that prices 
improve the consistency of choices: M = 4.97 versus 4, on a 
1 (“definitely decreases”) to 7 (“definitely increases”) scale: 
t(32) = 3.91, p  =.0017
Some research in the time-money literature seems to cor 
roborate this intuition, which runs counter to our empirical 
evidence. In particular, prior work that has associated time 
(vs. money) with greater accounting difficulty and lower 
valuation precision suggests that choices involving time 
should exhibit less preference consistency (Leclerc, 
Schmitt, and Dube 1995; Okada and Hoch 2004). For exam 
ple, people’s expressed monetary equivalent of their time 
was found to be malleable —specifically, participants 
reported a significantly higher value when an expenditure of 
their time led to a positive compared with a negative con 
sumption experience (Okada and Hoch 2004). Zauberman
7Among these 33 respondents, 21 (64%) indicated that prices would 
increase the degree of their choice consistency, 9 (27%) indicated that price 
would neither increase nor decrease their choice consistency, and only 3 (9%) 
indicated that price would decrease the degree of their choice consistency.
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and Lynch (2005) find greater temporal inconsistency for 
time than money. Because of the greater difficulty in men 
tally accounting for time, individuals are less susceptible to 
the sunk-cost effect when the cost is framed in terms of time 
rather than money (Soman 2001). Saini and Monga (2008), 
arguing that this greater ambiguity in the value of time ren 
ders processing time information more difficult, find a 
greater reliance on heuristics when people make decisions 
about time than when they make decisions about money, as 
they sought to simplify the decision process.
Given these difficulties in grasping the value of time or 
accounting for it relative to money, why then do we find 
more consistent preferences when choices involve a time 
attribute? We believe that there is an important distinction to 
be made between the context examined in these prior stud 
ies and the context in the present set of experiments. In the 
prior studies, time was conceived as a medium of exchange, 
and the studies thus required participants, explicitly or 
implicitly, to place a value on time. As Okada and Hoch 
(2004, p. 322) note, “We conceptualized time as a medium 
of exchange in our study, where people acquire something 
in consideration for performing some activity, rather than 
the simple passing of minutes and hours in exchange for 
which one receives nothing, such as unexpected delays at 
airports (Leclerc et al. 1995).” Similarly, in Soman (2001), 
decisions were studied in the context of scenarios that 
involved, for example, working a certain number of hours in 
return for a concert ticket or participating in hours of market 
research in return for a one-day cruise. In Saini and Monga 
(2008), participants considered a trade-off between a greater 
expense of time in the form of more time spent searching 
and a more desirable payoff such as finding the cheapest 
option.
We argue that this particular conceptualization of time is 
less relevant in the product choice context we examine. In 
our experiments, time is explicitly presented as one of sev 
eral attributes of the product options, and by design, there 
was no systematic correlation between the time attribute 
and other attributes. For example, in the experiments in 
which we used flights as product options, a shorter flight 
time was not necessarily associated with worse service lev 
els or worse in-flight entertainment. If the experimental 
context were altered such that participants were prompted to 
treat time as a medium of exchange, it is likely that lower 
levels of preference consistency will be observed. An exam 
ination of this possibility and the conditions under which 
the various properties of time would manifest seems a 
worthwhile avenue for further research.
It is also interesting to contrast our findings with those of 
Saini and Monga (2008). In particular, Saini and Monga 
find greater heuristic use (i.e., anchoring and choosing the 
compromise option) when they primed participants to think 
about time rather than money. Might participants in the time 
condition in our experiments have also relied on heuristics, 
which then engendered greater consistency in preferences? 
We think not, for several reasons. First, prior research sug 
gests that heuristic processing does not necessarily lead to 
consistent preferences and may even generate less prefer 
ence stability (Amir and Levav 2008; Gigerenzer 2000; 
Tversky 1969). Rather, heuristic processing generates con 
sistent preferences if and only if the choice context is stable 
over time (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993), which was
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not the case in our experiments given that participants faced 
a different pair of options on each choice occasion. Thus, 
while Saini and Monga’s finding, that people are more 
likely to use heuristics in decisions for which time (vs. 
money) is invested in exchange for a benefit, is noteworthy, 
the underlying mechanism for that effect is likely to be dif 
ferent from the mechanism that underlies the current set of 
studies.
Second, and more broadly, our focus on analytical versus 
affective processing is conceptually distinct from Saini and 
Monga’s (2008) focus on deliberative versus heuristic pro 
cessing. While the reliance on affect can operate as a heuris 
tic (Slovic et al. 2007), affect can also influence decision 
making through other more deliberative mechanisms 
(Avnet, Pham, and Stephen 2012; Cohen, Pham, and 
Andrade 2008). As such, reliance on feelings does not nec 
essarily imply greater heuristic use and a faster response 
time. This is consistent with our empirical results in which 
we found that people in the time condition did not take sig 
nificantly less time to make their choices than those in the 
money condition,8 unlike the results of Saini and Monga 
(2008), suggesting that different mechanisms were at play. 
Indeed, the mechanism underlying their findings is not 
likely to have involved affect. In particular, the authors used 
a stronger compromise effect under time consideration as 
one of two focal demonstrations of greater heuristic use. 
Prior studies, however, have found that the preference for 
compromise options is reduced rather than enhanced when 
there is a greater reliance on affect (Pham and Parker 2009). 
In a similar vein, Dhar and Gorlin (2013) note that the com 
promise effect is attenuated under time pressure (Pettibone 
2012) and when mental resources are depleted (Pochep- 
tsova et al. 2009), and the effect is in fact the product of 
deliberative processing. Together, these results further 
underscore the conceptual distinction between Saini and 
Monga’s study and our research.
Practical Implications
Our experimental findings suggest some potential direct 
marketing implications. First, marketers may want to con 
sider more carefully whether to focus on price information 
when designing persuasive marketing messages. For exam 
ple, a product marketed on the basis of hedonic attributes is 
likely to benefit little from its advertising if consumers 
process the message with an incongruous analytical mind 
set. In this case, marketers may want to refrain from draw 
ing attention to price information to avoid evoking more 
analytical processing. Second, our results also seem espe 
cially pertinent in the current age of “big data,” in which 
companies amass and analyze huge amounts of information 
about consumers and may rely on consumers’ transaction 
history to predict their future purchases and design offers 
that would be attractive to them. Arguably, while the under 
lying assumption of this enterprise is that consumers’ pref 
erences are consistent, our results underscore that this
8A different methodological reason could also account in part for this 
null difference in response time between the time and money conditions in 
our experiments. Given the multiattribute setup of the pairwise choice task, 
participants in both conditions might have taken some time to study the 
given product attributes, and this amount of time might have overshadowed 
the actual time participants spent making their decisions.
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assumption may not always be met, as there can be varying 
degrees of consistency depending on whether consumers 
adopt a more analytical or affective mindset at the point of 
purchase.
Finally, consumers’ own welfare can be better served if 
they are aware of the differential impact that focusing on 
money versus time can have on how they process product 
information and, in turn, the stability of their evaluations 
and decisions. That said, it is important to note that we are 
not claiming that consistent preferences are always the right 
preferences, nor are we promoting biased (albeit consistent) 
preferences. Rather, our interest in this work lies in the dif 
ferent processing modes that money and time considerations 
trigger and their impact on the consistency of preferences.
Further Research
Our studies have uncovered a tendency for people to 
adopt different modes of processing when choices involve 
the consideration of money or time, and this tendency 
occurs spontaneously. In the case of money consideration, 
the reason for greater analytical processing is likely rooted 
in the fact that money plays a ubiquitous role in daily trans 
actions, and the routine assessment of value (i.e., the weigh 
ing of benefits and costs) in these transactions has fostered a 
mindset that is analytical in nature. The generality of such a 
claim warrants further examination. It would be interesting 
to understand, for example, if there are consumption situa 
tions under which money consideration does not evoke ana 
lytical processing or if consumer segments exist that, per 
haps by virtue of personality dispositions or demographic 
factors (e.g., income level), do not spontaneously activate 
an analytical processing mode when faced with a price tag. 
One such situation may occur when a discount is tied to the 
price tag, which could induce greater affective processing 
instead (Aydinli, Bertini, and Lambrecht 2014; Lee and Tsai 
2014).
It would also be worthwhile to understand the conditions 
under which the “default” processing mode, be it analytical 
or affective, can be consciously overridden. For example, 
would explicit instructions to consumers to adopt an affec 
tive mode when considering money improve preference 
consistency, and conversely, would explicit instructions to 
adopt an analytical mode in the case of time hurt preference 
consistency? There is reason to believe that overriding 
affective processing would be more difficult to achieve than 
overriding analytical processing. We base this conjecture on 
Epstein’s (1998) argument that affective processing is often 
dominant over analytical processing and experienced as 
more compelling, given that the former is associated with 
feelings and the latter is dispassionate. Further research 
could examine the potential existence of this asymmetry 
and elucidate the nature of the relationship between the two 
modes.
Our findings focus on the downstream consequence of 
money versus time considerations on preference consis 
tency. Another potential area for further research may be 
other consequences of the different processing modes that 
the consideration of money versus time activates. One such 
consequence is attitude strength: it is plausible that, com 
pared with the greater analytical processing that money con 
sideration triggers, the greater affective processing that 
accompanies decisions involving time will lead to product
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attitudes that are stronger and held with greater confidence. 
Another promising topic may be the impact of affective (vs. 
analytical) processing on context effects—in particular, the 
possibility that holistic thinking and the reliance on feelings 
would dampen other context effects beyond the compromise 
effect (Pham and Parker 2009).
Conclusion
Overall, the results of our experiments demonstrate that 
there are clear process and outcome differences when prod 
uct choices involve the consideration of money or time. 
This no doubt erodes the validity of the common adage 
“time is money.” Certainly, one of the most important func 
tions of money is to serve as a standard measure of an 
object’s worth. That is, people use money to represent and 
compare the utility of otherwise dissimilar objects on a 
common metric. The ability to draw meaningful compari 
sons in turn enables the development of preference order 
ings and therefore contributes to sound decision making. In 
line with this argument, money makes exchanges more effi 
cient. Yet the argument hinges on the assumption that mone 
tary worth, expressed as a price, is a precise representation 
of utility. Given the cognitive noise and preference inconsis 
tency that monetary consideration may generate, our 
research shows that, at the very least, there is room for 
doubt.
APPENDIX: COMPARISON OF CHOICE-IMPUTED 
ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTS (EXPERIMENT 3)
In Experiment 3, to analyze whether participants in the 
money and time conditions placed differential weight on the 
focal attribute in their actual product choices, we performed 
the following steps9: We began by running separate binary- 
choice models using logistic regressions for each participant 
to compute the weights placed on the various attributes. 
Specifically, we regressed participants’ choice of the left 
option (binary dependent variable) on the standardized dif 
ferences in the attribute value of food as well as the focal 
attribute (duration in the time condition, price in the money 
condition). We omitted the activities attribute from the 
regression because, by design, the values of this attribute 
were almost perfectly negatively correlated with the values 
of the food attribute (r = -.98, p < .001); this design feature 
provides inherent trade-offs in attributes across options.
Next, we used a t-test to compare the imputed relative 
standardized weights on the focal attribute between the time 
and money condition. We computed relative standardized 
weights on the focal attribute by dividing the standardized 
coefficient for duration/price by the standardized coefficient 
for food from the per-participant logistic regressions (Train 
2009). Because participants almost always preferred longer 
and cheaper vacations, we reversed the signs of the coeffi 
cients for price for participants in the money condition to 
allow for comparability. In addition, analyzing the choices 
that participants made, we noted that six participants in the 
money condition and eight participants in the time condition 
adopted a lexicographic rule when choosing between 
options —specifically, they always chose the longer or the 
cheaper vacation. These participants were removed from the
9We performed the same analysis on the choice data from Experiments 1
and 2, which yielded similar results.
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analysis since their imputed relative weights on the focal 
attribute were undefined.10
Results of the t-test revealed that participants in the 
money and time conditions did not differ significantly in 
their imputed relative weights on the focal attribute (t(72) = 
-1.20,/? = .233). Furthermore, the main preference consis 
tency result—that participants in the money condition com 
mitted more transitivity violations than those in the time 
condition —remained significant after controlling for the 
imputed relative standardized weight (focal attribute/food) 
on the focal attribute (t(71) = 2.21,p =. 030).
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